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Gagnon. This is a fertile area for parolees anxious to test their status
under the expanding requirements of due process and the newly developing double jeopardy doctrine. Also, a precise definition of the standard
of proof to be used in federal parole revocation hearings is needed. A
radical modification of the standard of proof in revocation hearings will
likely be difficult to achieve. Even though there are constitutional arguments favoring the change, the due process principles are sufficiently
elusive to support either position.'
In assessing the potential success of challenges to the law enunciated in
Standlee, it is likely that an argument based upon the double jeopardy
doctrine will be the stronger approach. First, there is already support for
.~~
the fifth amendment
the position, as indicated by G r ~ y s o n Second,
does not draw distinctions among the many types of proceedings, nor is
the double jeopardy clause restricted to criminal trials. A single sovereign should not be able to circumvent a constitutionally guaranteed freedom by drawing meaningless distinctions between two closely related
proceedings. Finally, the constitutional protection afforded by the
double jeopardy doctrine in cases such as Standlee appeals to notions of
fairness and justice, which may prove to be the single most important
consideration when the question ultimately reaches the Supreme Court.

Elections - CORRUPTPRACTICES
-CORPORATEMONEYCONTRIBUTOINFLUENCE
THE OUTCOME
OF BALLOT-MEASURE
CAMPAIGNS
Schwartz v . Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).

TIONS

On May 24, 1971, the New York Legislature enacted the Transportation Capital Facilities Bond Act of 1971 which authorized the State
Comptroller to issue bonds in the amount of $2.5 billion upon approval
by the voters in the 1971 general election.' A nonprofit corporation,
Yes for Transportation in New York State, Inc. (YES), was organized on
August 24, 1971, to campaign for voter approval of the Act. YES received
individual and corporate contributions, including $50,000 from the New
York Telephone Company (NYT), a wholly owned subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).
By letter dated January 26, 1972, the executive director of the Project
on Corporate Responsibility (Project), a nonprofit corporation owning
one share of AT&T stock, notified the Chairman of the Board of A T & T
and the President of NYT of the Project's belief that NYT's $50,000
contribution to YES violated section 460 of the New York Election Law
74319N.E.2d 43.

'N.Y. CONST.art. VII, 5 1 1 disallows any legislative enactment which increases the public
debt unless approved by a majority of the voters in a general election. The Capital Facilities
Bond Act of 197 1 was not so approved in New York's 197 1 general election.
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which prohibits corporate contributions to "any candidate for political
office, or for nomination for such office, or for any political purpose whatever . . . .'" Project demanded, on behalf of NYT's shareholders, that the
officers and directors of NYT responsible for making the contribution
be held personally liable for its repayment to NYT. NYT's General
Solicitor responded that repayment would not be sought because NYT's
officers and directors had made the contribution in the belief that it
would advance the public welfare as well as NYT's interest in improved
transportation, and in reliance upon the opinion of its own and outside
counsel that the contribution did not violate section 460.
T o compel repayment of the $50,000, Project filed a shareholders
derivative action, Schwartz v . Romnes? against YES and the individual
officers and directors of AT&T and NYT, respectively, alleging that
NYT's contribution to YES violated section 460 of the New York Election
Law and section 107 of the New York Public Service Law.4 On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court entered summary judg-

2N.Y. ELECTIONLAW5 460 (McKinney Supp. 1973). In 1974, section 460 became section
LAW.The New York Legislature also enacted section 480(b) which
480(a) of the N.Y. ELECTION
allows corporations to make political expenditures not exceeding $5000 in the aggregate in any
one year notwithstanding the total prohibition of section 480(a).
(a) No corporation orjoint-stock association doing business in this state, except a corporation or association organized or maintained for political purposes only, shall directly or
indirectly pay or use or offer, consent or agree to pay or use any money or property for or
in aid of any political party, committee or organization, or for, [or] in aid of, any corporation, joint-stock or other association organized or maintained for political purposes, or for,
or in aid of, any candidate for political office or for nomination for such office, or for any
political purpose whatever, or for the reimbursement or indemnification of any person for
moneys or property so used. Any officer, director, stock-holder, attorney or agent of any
corporation or joint-stock association which violates any of the provisions of this section,
who participates in, aids, abets or advises or consents to any such violations, and any
person who solicits or knowingly receives any money or property in violation of this
section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision a of this section, any corporation or
any organization financially supported, in whole or in part, by such corporation may
make expenditures, including contributions, not otherwise prohibited by law, for
political purposes, in any amount not to exceed five thousand dollars in the aggregate in
any calendar year.
LAW5 480 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.Y. ELECTION
3357 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). Project commenced the
original derivative action but was replaced by the present named plaintiff when it was determined that Project was not a shareholder of AT&T at the time of the act complained of, as
required for a derivative action by Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
LAW5 107 (McKinney 1955) provides:
4N.Y. PUB.SERV.
Except with the consent and approval of the public service commission first had and
obtained, no public utility shall use revenues received from the rendition of public service
within the state for any purpose other than its operating, maintenance and depreciation
expenses, the construction, extension, improvement or maintenance of its facilities and
service, the payment of its indebtedness and interest thereon, and the payment of dividends to its stockholders.

2351

CASE NOTES

237

men@against the individual officers and directors for $50,000, holding
that NYT's contribution violated section 460 because an election referendum is political within the meaning of the phrase "for any political
purpose whatever." T h e court also held that NYT's contribution
violated section 107 of the New York Public Service Law because the
payment was neither incurred by NYT as an operating expense nor approved by the New York Public Service Commission as a nonoperating
expense. The court further held that prohibiting NYT's contribution to
YES did not contravene NYT's first amendment rights of expression
since the legislative purposes behind the statute "justiEf.restriction of the
rights of a public utility to engage in political advocacy." O n appeal,
the Second Circuit reversed, finding no violation of section 460 since
NYT's contribution had been made in support of a nonpartisan bond
referendum. T h e circuit court also held that section 107 had not been
violated, relying primarily upon a New York Public Service Commission
ruling, issued subsequent to the district court's decision, which approved
NYT's contribution to YES.6

A. History and Objectives of Corrupt Practices Legislation
Section 460 of the New York Election Law was enacted in 19067 in
response to a joint senate and assembly investigation of life insurance
companies which revealed, in part, that several New York legislators consistently protected the interests of life insurance companies that had
given financial assistance to their election campaigns.8 Illustrative of the
spirit in which the money had been given is the following statement by
an executive officer of a life insurance company which made a practice
of contributing to election campaigns:
I don't justify the use of money for campaign purposes. I justify the use
of these funds in the protection of the policyholder's interests. I don't
5Defendant YES was granted summary judgment in its favor on the ground that plaintiff
had failed to establish that YES had acted unlawfully, or that it had, or breached, any duty
to AT&T shareholders.
6Plaintiff also argued thar NYT's contribution was ultra vires as an unauthorized corporate
act. T h e court discarded this theory, however, holding that to the extent NYT's contribution
was prompted by a concern for transportation and the economy as a whole, it was protected
by N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW$202(a)(12) (McKinney 1963); and to the extent it was prompted by
the business benefits to be derived from better roadways, it was protected by the traditional
corporate benefit rule.
This case note will consider only the issues encompassed by section 460 and will reflect o n
the other main issues only as they relate to section 460.
'The initial prohibition against corporate campaign contributions was enacted as part of
the General Corporation Law. From 1928 to 1965 it was part of the Penal Law. It became
part of the Election Law in 1965.
THECOSTSOF DEMOCRACY
129 (1960).
8A. HEARD,
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care about the Republican side of it, or the Democratic side of it. . . .
What is best for the New York Life is what moves and actuates me.9
Motivated by similar concerns, Congress and 33 other state legislatures
passed statutes similar to section 460.1° Most of these statutes are part of
a comprehensive scheme regulating corrupt practices in election campaigns and were enacted to accomplish two main 0bjectives:ll (1) to
prevent corporate officers from using shareholders' assets to influence the
outcome of elections or to support candidates, parties, or issues which
some shareholders might oppose; and (2) to prevent postelection obligations running from the successful candidate to the donor of the funds.
Corrupt practice statutes typically provide criminal sanctions, both for
those who authorize prohibited contributions and for the recipients of
the contributions, including fines h-om $500 to $10,000 and jail sentences up to one year.l2

B. Scope of the Legislation
Although the federal and several of the state statutes prohibit only
corporate contributions to political parties and candidates running for
public office,l3 18 of the state statutes are of breadth similar to New
York's, in that they effectively prohibit corporate contributions for "any
political purpose whatever. "I4 The courts are divided, however, as to
whether corporate contributions paid to others to influence the outcome
of referenda constitute a prohibited contribution for a political purpose.l?
In People v . Gansley,16 a brewing company's contribution to a political
9Zd.
1OThe federal statute is found at 18 U.S.C. 5 610 (1970). T h e state statutes include e.g., FLA.
STAT.ANN.5 104.091 (1960); MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 55, 5 7 (Supp. 1975); UTAHCODEANN.
$31-27-11 (1953).
"See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-75 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106, 113, 134-35 (1948); Barrow, Regulation of Campaign Funding and Spending for Federal
Ofice, 5 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM159, 163 (1972); Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN.L. REV.1, 39 (1966).
12E.g., CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.5 9-345 (Supp. 1974); MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 55, 5 7 (Supp.
1975); TEX.ELECTION
CODEANN.art. 14.07 (Supp. 1974). In addition, several statutes provide
for corporate fines or withdrawal of the right to do business within the state. E.g., MINN.
STAT.ANN.5 21 1.27 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
13The federal statu-te, 18 U.S.C. $610 (1970), prohibits corporate contributions or expenditures "in connection with" any election for federal ofice. State statutes which apply only to
corporate contributions to political parties or candidates include e.g., ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN.
5 16-471(Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT.ANN.5 19:34-45(1964); ORE.REV.STAT.$260.472 (1973).
14E.g., MJCH.COMP.LAWS
ANN.5 168.919 (1967) (any election expenses whatever); OHIOREV.
CODEANN.5 3599.03 (Page 1972) (any other partisan political purpose); W. VA. CODEANN.
5 3-8-8 (197 1) (other election expenses whatever).
15For a general discussion of the role corporate contributions play in ballot-measure campaigns see Comment, Corporate Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 6 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM781 (1973).
16191 Mich. 357,364-67, 158 N.W. 195, 197-99(1916).
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committee organized to defeat a local option election in Michigan which
would have prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor within the
county, was held to be a prohibited political contribution. Under similar
facts, the Indiana Supreme Court in State v . Fairbanks17 upheld an
indictment charging a brewing company's president with making illegal
campaign contributions. In a more recent case, however, State e x rel.
Corrigan v . Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.,l8 a corporate contribution of $500
to a committee created for the purpose of advocating certain propositions
and issues to be submitted to the Ohio voters, was held proper. Citing
the Ohio statute which proscribes corporate contributions to "partisan
political purposes, the court stated :
"

Thus, although the words "political purposes" may be given a broad construction as including any purpose related to the principles of civil
government and the conduct of public affairs, they may also be given a
much narrower construction as including only a "partisan" political
purpose. In the instant case, we must so limit these words because the
General Assembly has used the word "partisan" to limit them.19

By judicial construction, a similar gloss has frequently been added to
the corrupt practice acts of other states, even where the word partisan
was lacking2(' The range of activities comprehended by "partisan political activity," however, is often as unclear as the range of activities comprehended by "political activity." In the Corrigan case, for example, the
court relied on the word partisan in reaching a decision but failed to
articulate a meaningful definition.
C . First Amendment Considerations
Closely associated with the definitional difficulties are the constitutional uncertainties of the corrupt practice statutes. In recent years, the
corporate spending prohibition has been severely attacked by commentators who argue that total prohibition of corporate campaign spending is an unconstitutional violation of the corporation's first amendment
.~~
of the prohibition answer that Congress
right of e x p r e s s i ~ n Defenders
17187 Ind. 648, 115 N.E. 769 (1917); but see State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248,
115 N.E. 772 (1917), where the Indiana Supreme Court upheld dismissal of similar charges
against the corporation.
'8169 Ohio St. 42, 157 N.E.2d 331 (1959).
191d. at 44, 157 N.E.2d at 333. See aLso States ex re1 Nybo v. District Court, 158 Mont.'429,
492 P.2d 1395 (1972), where a statute prohibiting corporate contributions "in order to promote the interests, success or defeat of any political party or organization" was held inapplicable
to contributions to support passage of a sales tax.
20See generally United States Civil Sew. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). T h e Supreme Court
has interpreted regulations limiting the political activities of civil service employees to include
partisan political activities only.
THESYSTEM
OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION
637 (1970); H. PENNIMAN
AND R.
21See T. EMERSON,
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has reasonably exercised its constitutional authority in protecting the
electoral system from harmful and corrupting influence.22 In response,
state and federal courts have generally tended to avoid delineating the
permissible breadth of corporate expression in the context of corrupt
practice acts,23 and have adhered to the rule of statutory construction
which requires a statute to be construed, if possible, so as to avoid the conclusion that it is unconstitutional.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never construed the
federal ban on corporate campaign contributions, it has on three occasions construed that part of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act dealing
with expenditures by labor unions in support of political campaigns,24
which would appear to be equally applicable to corporate contributions
to similar causes.25 On each occasion, however, the Court stopped short
of the constitutional issues raised, relying generally on statutory construction to hold that the union expenditures did not fall within the language
of the ~tatute.~6
HOWARD,
CAMPAIGN
FINANCES:
TWO
VIEWSOF THE POLITICAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICA1 (1972); Ferman, Congressional Controls on Campaign Financing: An Expansion or
Contraction of the First Amendment?, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1972); King, Corporate Political
Spending and the First Amendment, 23 U. PITT.L. &v. 847,854-79 (1962); Lambert, Corporate
Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV.1033, 1060-66(1965).
Z2See Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV.J. LEGIS.359 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenthal] , Note, Statutory Regulation of Political Campaign Funds,
66 HARV.L. REV. 1259, 1260-61 (1953). For a general discussion of the free speech implications
of campaign spending prohibitions see Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV.CIV.RIGHTS-CIV.
LIB.L. REV.214 (1972).
23Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033,
1060-66 (1965).

TIONS

24

T h e Smith-Connally Act of 1943 contained a provision which extended the provisions of
section 313 [18 U.S.C. 5 6101 to labor organizations . . . . In 1947 . . . a labor bill . . . had
the effect of continuing permanently the application of section 313 to labor organizations.
Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free Speech, 53 Nw. U.L. REV.61 (1958).
25The REPORTOF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION
ON CAMPAIGN
COSTS,FINANCING
PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS
20-21 (1962) stated:
From our study of the section [18 U.S.C. § 6101, its legislative history, and the applicable
court decisions, it is clear that no distinction is intended between corporations and unions
with respect to political contributions and expenditures.
261n United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), the union supported a candidate for Congress in a regular union newspaper which was published with union funds and distributed
solely to union members. T h e district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the
statute was an unconstitutional abridgment of the first amendment. T h e Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but did so solely on the ground that a publication in a regular union
newspaper which was distributed only to members and a few other persons is not reached by
the statute. In a minority opinion, four Justices concurred in the result but argued that any
prohibition against union expenditures would be unconstitutional as an interference with
free speech.
In United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Supreme Court upheld an indictment for
using union funds to pay for a television broadcast supporting certain candidates for federal
office. Holding that the constitutional issues were not ripe for adjudication, the Court re-
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Several lower courts, however, have confronted the constitutionality
of corporate spending prohibitions. In United States u. United States
Brewers' A s s o c i a t i ~ n the
, ~ ~ Western District Court of Pennsylvania upheld an indictment charging the corporation with conspiring to make
money contributions in a congressional election. T h e district court
explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute, stating:
The section itself neither prevents, nor purports to prohibit, the freedom
of speech or of the press. Its purpose is to guard elections from corruption, and the electorate from corrupting influences in arriving at their
choice.28

In a more recent case, United States w . Boyle,zg the District Court of the
District of Columbia sustained an indictment charging union officials
with conspiracy to violate the federal statute. T h e court found that the
statute did not unreasonably infringe on rights of free speech and association beyond those which the government had demonstrated a compelling
interest in regulating.sO On the other hand, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in First National Bank v . Attorney GeneraP1 held unconstitumanded the case for trial on the merits, suggesting the lower court analyze the following questions: (1) whether the expenditures were from union dues or from voluntary contributions of
the members; (2) whether the broadcast reached the public at large or only union members;
(3) whether the expenditures involved active "electioneering" or o ~ l ythe publication of statistics or records of candidates; and (4) whether the expenditure was made to affect the results of
the election. On remand, the jury found the union not guilty after considering the foregoing
factors. A three-Justice dissenting opinion labeled the statute unconstitutional and criticized
the majority as allowing "a broadside assault on the freedom of political expression guaranteed
by the First Amendment." I d . at 598.
In Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972), the Supreme Court reversed
a circuit court decision upholding the constitutionality of the federal statute, but only on the
grounds that an improper charge had been given to the jury regarding voluntariness of member contributions to union political funds.
27239 F.163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
281d. at 169. The court cited no precedent and gave no reasons for upholding the validity
of the statute. It stated: "So far as I am aware, it has never been claimed that this general
restriction upon political contributions was an infringement of the freedom of the press."
29338F. Supp. 1028 (D.D.C. 1972).
3OIn reaching its decision, the court balanced the interests of the government in protecting
the electoral system against the labor organization's interest in free speech. See also United
States v. Lewis Food Company, 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Painters Local
481,172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
3l290 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1972). MASS.GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 55, 0 7 (Supp. 1975) proscribes
corporate contributions " [fJor the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the nomination
or election of any person to public ofice. . . or influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business
or assets of the corporation." A 1972 amendment added the provision that " [n] o question
submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation." The court held that the amendment amounted to impermissible censorship and was
unconstitutional under both the first and fourteenth amendments, since the defendant attorney
general had failed to show a compelling state interest in imposing a total ban on corporate
expression. I d . at 539.
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tional the section of the Massachusetts corrupt practices statute which
prohibited the plaintiff bank from spending money for advertising and
publicity in its effort to defeat a proposed state constitutional amendment authorizing a graduated income tax. In a similar case, United States
v . First National Bank,32 the Southern District Court of Ohio dismissed
the indictment of a national bank for having made a loan to a campaign
committee. Emphasizing the difference between a prohibited political
contribution by a corporation and a loan made in the ordinary course of
a bank's activities, the court concluded with the following interpretation
of section 6 10 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act:
The evil in Section 610 is not that it prohibits the political expression of
a national bank, but that it directly affects the political expression of
individuals who may wish to utilize their assets to secure credit on behalf
of a particular candidate.33

T h e most recent New York case construing section 460 of the New
~~
York Election Law, Pecora v . Queens County Bar A ~ s o c i a t i o n ,held
that endorsement of political candidates by a local bar association was not
a prohibited activity. Although the court avoided the constitutional
issue by narrowly interpreting the words "political purpose," it indicated
that a literal interpretation would stifle constitutionally protected expression.35

The present case is representative of how the courts have avoided the
constitutional issue by narrowing the scope of the statute's application.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a ban on contributions
for "political purposes" did not include corporate contributions to "nonpartisan" referenda. Citing legislative history leading to enactment of
section 460, the court stated:
Thus the avowed objective was not to bar all corporate expenditures
with respect to legislative matters generally but to prohibit corporate
contributions to candidates or parties, since such contributions might
tend to create political debts . . . .
In all this legislative history we find no indication that the framers
envisioned the application of 5 460 to referenda.36
--

32329 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
33Id. at 1254. There is now included in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act an exception for
bona fide bank loans. Campaign Act 5 205,86 Stat. 10, amending 18 U.S.C. 5 610 (1970).
3446 Misc. 2d 530,260 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1965).
35The court decided that the bar association had a professional duty to the public to see
that only qualified candidates attained judicial offices and therefore the association was not
using funds for an entirely "political" purpose. Id. at 537,260 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
36495 F.2d 844,850 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The court concluded that referenda are not susceptible to those corrupting influences which prompted enactment of section 460.
Candidly avoiding the first amendment issue, the court further stated:
In adopting a narrow interpretation of 5 460 we are but following the
example set by the Supreme Court in its encounters with the Corrupt Practices Act, the federal analog of 5 460. Concerned with
the serious constitutional doubts that would afflict a broad interpretation
of the federal statute's prohibition of contributions or expenditures in
support of a political candidate, the court has consciously opted for a
restrictive reading of the statute's words.37

Accordingly, the court held that the contribution from NYT to YES
was not prohibited by section 460.

A. Legislative History
In arriving at the conclusion that corporate contributions in the context of a "nonpartisan" referendum were not for "political purposes,"
the majority in Schwartz cited Elihu Root's porposed constitutional
amendment presented to the New York State Constitutional Convention
in 1894,38 as the forerunner of section 460 and noted that the amendment was specifically concerned with the corruption of legislators, a
concern usually of little importance in the context of a referendum vote.
Although unsuccessful in his efforts, Root urged adoption of the amendment in order to:
[PI revent the great moneyed corporations of the country from furnishing the money with which to elect members of the Legislature of this
State in order that those members of the Legislature may vote to protect
the corporations. . . . [TIhe time has come when something ought to be
done to put a check to the giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great corporation toward political purposes, upon the understanding that a debt
is created from a political party to it, a debt to be recognized and repaid
with the votes of representatives in the Legislature and in Congress . . . .39

The dissenting opinion sharply criticized the court's reliance on the
Root amendment as misplaced, and cited the 1906 Report of the Joint
Committee of the Senate and Assembly of New York Appointed to Investigate the Affairs of Lzfe Insurance Companies40 as the impetus for
section 460. The following statement from the committee's report illustrates that possible improper application of shareholder funds was con-

3'1d. at 852.
383 Revised Record of the 1894 New York State Constitutional Convention 885 (1900).
391d. at 894-95.
40495 F.2d at 855.
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sidered as important a reason for regulating corporate contributions as
the purchase of political influence.
Contributions by insurance corporations for political purposes should be
strictly forbidden. Neither executive officers nor directors should be
allowed to use the moneys paid for purposes of insurance in support
of political candidates or platforms. . . . Whether made for the purpose
of supporting political views or with the desire to obtain protection for
the corporation, these contributions have been wholly unjustifiable. In
the one case executive officers have sought to impose their political views
upon a constituency of divergent convictions, and in the other they have
been guilty of a serious offense against public morals.41

B. Statutory Construction
The dissent also criticized the court's conclusion that the statute on its
face is not applicable to a referendum which has bipartisan supp0rt.4~
Citing the statute's omnibus clause which prohibits corporate contributions "for any political purpose whatever," and a clause preceding the
omnibus clause that prohibits gifts to "any corporation, joint-stock or
other association organized or maintained for political purposes, the
dissent suggested that the language of both clauses goes beyond contributions to the traditional political party or candidate for public office.
Although meager, New York case law supports the proposition that
section 460 encompasses payments to any entity created to achieve a
political purpose. In People ex rel. Bohlinger v . International Workers
Order, Inc.,43 a New York lower court found that contributions by a
labor organization for the support of communist policies and candidates
it favored violated section 460; no weight was placed on whether the
recipient was one of the traditional political parties. The referendum
matter in Schwartz, regardless of any support it may have received from
the Republican and Democratic parties, was not a one-sided, nonpolitical issue. The dissent properly characterized the campaign preceding the election as "perhaps the most bitterly contested issue of the 1971
campaign."44 YES was organized and maintained for the sole purpose of
campaigning for voter approval of the transportation bond referendum,
an extremely partisan position, especially in light of the overwhelming
vote against the action in the 197 1 general election.
"

41Zd.(emphasis added).
42The court based this conclusion on the bipartisan support the bond issue received in the
state senate and assembly. The senate vote was 42 in favor (27 Republicans and 15 Democrats)
and 13 against (three Republicans and ten Democrats); the assembly vote was 124 in favor (61
Republicans and 63 Democrats) and 25 against (17 Republicans and eight Democrats). Brief
for Individual Appellants at 5, Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
43305 N.Y. 258, 112 N.E.2d 280 (1953).
44495 F.2d at 857.
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C. Policy Considerations

The dissent further contended that the bond referendum did lend itself to the corrupting influences which prompted enactment of section
460. Appellees suggested that NYT's contribution to YES was motivated by a desire to purchase influence with the governor who was totally
devoted to the passage of the proposition, and whose appointments secretary resigned for a brief period to head up the efforts of YES. The three
public utility companies who had contributed to YES,45 including NYT,
were at that time seeking rate increases from the New York Public Service Commission, whose members are appointed by the governor.46 Although there was no evidence to support suspicions of influence
peddling, the dissent asserted that application of section 460 should not
depend upon the purity of the donees or the probity of the donors, but
rather upon the opportunities for abuse created by the corporate contribution.47 The "opportunities for abuse" standard is particularly important in this case since large political contributions by public utilities
may result in favors with respect to rate making or in higher utility
rates to make up for the cost of the contributions.

D. First Amendment Considerations
In narrowing the scope of section 460, the court believed that a broad
construction of the statute would impinge upon corporate first amendment rights by prohibiting the expression of corporate views on important public issues. While this belief musters wide support, its legitimacy is dependent upon two substantive issues, neither expressly discussed by the court: (1) the extent to which corporate contributions for
political purposes are expression entitled to first amendment protection,
and (2) the appropriate scope of that protection.
1. Extent of corporate first amendment protection: the corporate
character. Historically, corporations have been given some, but not all,
Although they enjoy the
of the constitutional rights of indi~iduals.~g
protection of the due process and equal protection clauses, they are not
deemed to be citizens for purposes of the privileges and immunities
clause. In addition, they have no privilege against self-incrimination,
45N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 75, col. 3, reported seven known corporate contributors
including the three utility companies. T h e contributions totaled $159,000.
46495 F.2d at 857 n.3.
4'1d. In recognition of this potential for abuse, legislatures of many states have enacted
statutes similar to section 107 of the New York Public Service Law which prohibit the use of
revenues received from the rendition of public service for nonoperating expenses.
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority in Schwartz for not determining whether
NYT's contribution to YES actually came from nonutility revenues. T o say that they had nonutility revenues at the time of the contribution, claimed the dissent, is not dispositive of the
issue of what revenues were actually used. Id. at 859.
48See Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 380.
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and significantly to this discussion, they cannot vote. The Supreme
Court has held that corporations are entitled to first amendment protecti0n.~9 T h e decisions so holding, however, appear to be confined to
particular fact situations. In many of the cases, the corporations were in
the business of communicating information to the public, and the expression protected "was related to that function rather than to some extraneous interest. "50 ASone commentator stated:
There is a clear distinction between an editorial, news article, or
advertisement in a newspaper in support of a candidate and contributions
by a corporation to finance speeches or advertisements in support of a
candidate it believes to be friendly to its interests.51

Other cases suggest that corporate first amendment protection is derived from the first amendment rights of individuals within the corporation. In N A A C P v. Alabama,52 for example, the Supreme Court upheld
the refusal of a New York NAACP chapter to produce its membership
lists on the ground that it was asserting the first amendment rights of
its members. As to corporations engaged in the business of disseminating news to the public such as a newspaper corporation, however, it may
legitimately be asked whether the rights protected are those of the corporation itself or those of the potential reader or listener.53 In any event,
it seems clear that the law is presently uncertain as to the extent of corporate first amendment rights.
2. Scope of first amendment protection: the communicative act. Apparently assuming that NYT was entitled to first amendment protection,
the court in Schwartz went on to equate NYT's contribution with expression. Although the Supreme Court has held in certain areas of the law
that protection under the first amendment is not limited to speech, but
applies also to conduct which is so interrelated with expression that to
divorce one from the other is to effectively deny the expression,54 it does
not follow that corporate money contributions, even if they are the only
means by which a corporation can communicate, are part of expression
entitled to first amendment protection. One author commented that:
49Several cases are discussed in the materials cited note 21 supra.
50Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 380. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Grosjean v. American Press Co,,
297 U.S. 233 (1936).
SIRosenthal, supra note 22, at 380. This distinction was also important in United States v.
C I O and United States v. UAW, supra note 26. It appears that the Court used an internalexternal distribution test in upholding the publication of a solely owned union newspaper, but
questioning the use of union funds to buy television time.
52357 U.S. 449 (1958).
53See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
%ee, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); NAACP v.
Button, 37 1 U.S. 415 (1963). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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The right to speak . . . is more central to the values envisaged by the First
Amendment than the right to spend. We are dealing here not so much
with the right of personal expression or even association, but with dollars
and decibels. And just as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so
the volume of dollars may be limited without violating the First Amendment.55

The same author also compared the large contributor who exerts
"influence through wealth" to speakers using a "bullhorn or a microphone to enlarge the reach of their voices," and stated that both "are
operating vicariously through the power of their purse, rather than
through the power of their ideas, and . . . I would scale that relatively
lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values."56 The ultimate
resolution of the constitutional issue requires that a distinction be drawn
which upholds the validity of the restraint on mere contributions of
money, but overturns applications that touch too closely upon the direct
communication of ideas.57
3. NYT's contribution to YES. In Schwartr, the expressive element
of NYT's contribution of corporate assets to YES was mitigated by several
factors. First, the nature of NYT's communicative act, a money contribution to support the efforts of YES, was diluted because (I) control over
the use of the money was given entirely to YES, and (2) identification of
NYT as a corporate contributor occurred after the election and then only
in response to inquiries made by the New York Times.58 The importance
of these facts was stressed by Mr. Justice Reed, writing for the five-man
majority in United States v . CZO:
If section 313 [18 U.S.C. 5 6101 were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting
their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, or stockholders, or
customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of
measures, or the election to office of men espousing such measures, the
gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality.59

Second, the character of NYT, a public utility corporation not engaged in the business of disseminating news to the general public, and
whose activities are closely scrutinized because of its unique nature and
relationship with the general public, weakens its claim to absolute first
amendment protection. Here NYT supported with shareholder assets
a transportation bond issue which the majority of New York residents,
including NYT shareholders, voted against. It is therefore difficult to
55Freund, Commentary in A. ROSENTHAL,
FEDERAL
REGULATION
OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE:
SOMECONSTITUTIONAL
QESTIONS
72 (1971).
561d.at 74.
57Rosentha1, supra note 22, at 382.
58N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 75, col. 3.
59335 U.S. at 121 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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justify the contribution as an assertion of the rights of NYT's customers
and stockholders in favor of the bond issue.

IV. CONCLUSION
The court in Schwartz should have balanced the firm judicial policy
which favors avoidance of constitutional issues against an equally important rule of statutory construction: " [A] voidance of a difficulty will
not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion."60 Construing section 460 in view of the conditions which existed at the time of its enactment and which still exist today,61 it is clear that the New York Legislature intended the proscriptions of the statute to apply to both candidate
and ballot-measure campaigns. T o hold otherwise is to elevate form over
substance and effectively frustrate legislative objectives.
T h e court could have justifiably interpreted the statute to include
referenda and still upheld its constitutionality since the first amendment
protection to which NYT may have been entitled was mitigated by the
nature of its alleged communicative act and by its corporate character.
Failure of the court to confront the constitutional issue puts a loophole in
the statute which may open the door to unlimited corporate financial
participation in ballot-measure campaigns regardless of obvious opportunities for abuse.
T h e fact that there are some questions as to the constitutionality of
the corporate spending prohibition does not justify judicial avoidance of
those issues. The electoral system is fundamental to our system of representative democracy. Protecting it requires the highest degree of cooperation between the legislative and judicial branches of government.
60;2100reIce Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933).
61Recent scandals arising from corporate campaign contributions illustrate the continued
validity of the objectives which prompted enactment of the corrupt practice statutes. In 1970,
the officers and directors of two large shipping lines were convicted and fined $50,000 each
for making illegal campaign contributions; each had recently received multimillion dollar
government subsidies. REPORT
OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
FUND
TASKFORCE
ON FINANCING
CAMPAIGNS,
ELECTING
CONGRESS,
THE FINANCIAL
DILEMNA
49 (1970). In 1971, allegations of a
link between an antitrust settlement favorable to International Telephone and Telegraph
Company ( I T T ) and ITT's simultaneous pledge to underwrite for $400,000 the 1972 Republican national convention initiated investigations which continue today. NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 20,
1972, at 24. In 1973, officers and directors of several corporations including American Airlines
Company, 3hI Corporation, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Gulf Oil Company, and
Ashland Oil Company all pleaded guilty to formal charges of making illegal corporate contriWEEK,Oct. 22, 1973, at 36;
butions to President Nixon's reelection campaign h n d . AVIATION
NEWSWEEK,
NOV.26, 1953, at 34; U.S. NEWS,NOV.26, 1973, at 28. In 1974, two former officials
of the nation's largest milk producer-cooperative were sentenced to prison after being
found guilty of charges involving illegal campaign donations, including $600,000 for the Nixon
reelection campaign. According to testimony before congressional committees, the money was
part of $2 million pledged to Nixon by the dairy group in connection with the 1971 milk
support prices. Salt Lake Tribune, Nov. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 1.

